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Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11? 
Trauma and the Politics of 
Vulnerability 
 
James Brassett 
 
The paper provides a critical analysis of the possibility of a cosmopolitan response to traumatic 
events like 9-11. While cosmopolitan sentiments are celebrated for highlighting the question of 
vulnerability, it is argued that such questions are always-already rendered according to practices 
of governance that are ethically and politically problematic. In this sense, the paper explores what 
it  calls  the  ‘politics  of  vulnerability’  via  a  critical  engagement with David  Held’s  version  of 
cosmopolitan  democracy,  followed  by  a  problematisation  of  psychological  structures  of 
knowledge about trauma. Beyond the tranquilising effects of universal norms and/or the scientific 
certainty  of trauma  counselling,  the paper  makes  the  case  for developing  an  acute  empirical 
politics of the subjects of trauma. Ultimately, this argument does not then turn into a rejection of 
cosmopolitan  democracy,  so  much  as  a  call  for  its  further  politicisation  and  continuous 
engagement. 
 
Introduction1 
 
In the aftermath of 9-11 there ensued a battle for meaning over what had happened, 
its  political  significance,  and  how  to  respond  (Devetak,  2005;  Zehfuss,  2003). 
Protagonists and critics of the War on Terror were united in their assessment that 9-
11 marked a traumatic event: many people, ‘innocents’, died in a horrific and largely 
uncontrollable  fashion  (Edkins,  2002).  While  some  sought  to  honour  the  feelings 
and memory of those people with an aggressive display of (hyper) security, bent on 
lashing out, punishing, and asserting power in the face of vulnerability, others had a 
different take. Many, adopting a broadly cosmopolitan sentiment, sought to ‘use’ 9-
11 to reflect upon the meaning of vulnerability, and how it reaches into many more 
lives than were taken that day. On this view, a key question was how to respond to 
and  build  sympathy  in  order  to  deal  with  wide-spread  vulnerability  to  suffering 
(Brassett, 2008).  
This  cosmopolitan  sentiment  was  common  across  a  range  of  positions 
including, for example Andrew Linklater (2002) who argued that 9-11 provides an Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11, Brassett 
  
 
13 
opportunity to think through how we are all, in a sense, vulnerable to ‘unnecessary’ 
human suffering. Likewise, Judith Butler (2004) suggested that 9-11 could be seen as 
an opportunity to engage a ‘politics of mourning’ where life and grief, and specifically 
the question of whose lives are grieve-able could be seen a way of finding a point of 
identification  with  suffering  itself.  Further,  the  importance  of  the  ethico-political 
question  of  vulnerability,  was  evidenced  in  the  reactions  of  diverse  theorists  in 
including  Daniele  Archibugi,  Jacques  Derrida,  David  Held,  Maja  Zehfuss; 
journalist/authors such as Martin Amis, and artist/film makers such as Oliver Stone. 
Even  Chris  Brown  (2002),  so  often  measured  to  the  point  of  critique  in  his 
assessment  of  cosmopolitanism,  saw  fit  to  endorse  global  justice  as  ‘still’  the  right 
thing to do after 9-11.  
In  making  this  point  I  do  not  intend  to  assert  some  artificial  unity  of 
purpose  or  common  standard  of  ethics  among  these  authors.  The  differences 
between  such  approaches  are  clearly  politically  and  ethically  salient  and  for  a 
number of reasons. Moreover, as will be argued, the initial recognition was merely an 
opportunity  (only  partly  taken)  to  engage  with  what  I  call  the  ‘politics  of 
vulnerability’.  In  this  sense,  it  is  suggested,  initial  sentiments  to  understand  and 
engage  with  vulnerability  may  well  be  a  common  and  important  ethico-political 
question.  However,  in  straightforward  terms,  such  sentiments  only  become 
politically manifest in and through governmental responses. That is to say, ethics is 
not some  removed scholastic  or spiritual realm  of  thought  or  consideration,  but, 
rather, an embodied social practice that should be understood and engaged via the 
political  question  of  how  we  govern.  While  sympathetic  to  initial  cosmopolitan 
sentiments, then, this paper seeks to engage with a critical questioning of how they 
play  out  –  and  how  they  might  play  out  differently  -  in  political  processes  of  global 
governance.  
This question is addressed in three sections. Section 1 provides a critique 
of  David  Held’s  version  of  cosmopolitan  democracy  as  a  response  to  9-11.2  The 
cosmopolitan agenda to provide some combination of global justice, democracy and 
inclusion,  while  important,  arguably  reduces  questions  of  vulnerability  to  an 
instrumental  and  de-politicised  logic  –  (i.e.  justice  and  inclusion  will  tranquilise 
grievance and opposition to global violence) - that fails to reflect upon the tensions 
and disagreements within the much heralded ‘global communities of fate’. Thus, it is 
argued, we need to question the politics of cosmopolitan democracy, specifically, to 
understand what different people within Held’s ‘communities of fate’ actually think 
and  argue  for.  It  is  suggested  that  too much  in  Held’s  schema  is  afforded  to  the 
elision  of  an  unquestioned  global  scale  with  a  universal  normative  foundation  of 
individual  liberty.  This  elision  brackets  out  -  and  ultimately  defers  -  the  political 
tensions and contests within global communities of fate that might better be seen as Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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the ‘real stuff’ of global democracy.3  
Section 2 develops this point by suggesting that traumatic events like 9-11 
present a special set of challenges for grounding an ethical response – cosmopolitan 
or  otherwise.  Taking  forward  Held’s  problematic  constituency  I  ask  whether 
vulnerability to trauma can be seen as a basis for a ‘community of fate’. Does the 
experience  of  traumatic  events  foster  solidarity  in  the  face  of  vulnerability? While 
some  arguments  posit increased levels  of  altruism in  trauma  affected  communities 
(Solnit, 2009), others suggest division and hostility. Indeed, one must remember that 
while there was much international solidarity with those affected by 9-11, there was 
equally celebration in some quarters. Moreover, as Jenny Edkins (2003) suggests, the 
traumatic memories of communities are ripe for exploitation and subjection through 
the workings of sovereign power. On this view, much of the solidarity towards the 
affected of 9-11 was equally and at the same time concerned with affirming a state-
centric ontology of global politics; standing ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the US was 
clearly a precursor to the successful construction of a ‘coalition of the willing’. 
In  the  absence  of  a  clear  foundation  in  the  affected  communities  of 
trauma, it is questioned whether we might pay more attention to the governance of 
trauma via psychological knowledge about individuals? In this sense, while I share 
Held’s concern with the network-centrism of global governance I am also concerned 
with  the types  of  knowledge  that  function  within  such  networks;  knowledge  that  is 
constitutive  of  certain  political  possibilities  and  limits.  In  short,  while  a  traumatic 
event like 9-11 may open up new spaces for thinking and doing the politics of global 
ethics,  a  critical  approach  must  remain  sensitive  to  the  ways  in  which  new 
possibilities  are  always-already  limited  in  certain  respects.  Trauma  is  limited  in  its 
mediation by psychological knowledge. While laudable in many ways, particularly for 
turning attention to the actual subjects of trauma, i.e. the individuals affected, it is 
argued  that  existing  psychological  knowledge  operating  via  networks  of 
humanitarian  development  has  produced  a  problematic  consensus  on  trauma.  In 
common  with  existing  critical  approaches  to  such  ‘therapeutic  governance’ 
(Pupavac,  2001)  I  question  the  reduction  of  trauma  and  vulnerability  to  a 
technology of sympathy that 1) de-politicises the subject/event via the treatment of 
all  concerned  as  ‘mere  victims’  2)  re-ifies  particular  norms  of  correct  emotional 
behaviour  via  the  generalisation  of  rationalities  such  as  ‘Cognitive  Behavioural 
Therapy’ (CBT) and 3) subsequently labels trauma survivors as either ‘helpless’ or 
(ironically) ‘potential threats’ to the security of themselves or others (Aradau, 2008). 
Such technology is (potentially) a deferral of the politics of vulnerability.  
Thus finally, Section 3 questions whether and how we might better understand 
and  engage  trauma  and  vulnerability  from  a  cosmopolitan  perspective?  When 
trauma and global governance is problematised in the manner suggested, I argue, the 
key  question  that  emerges  is  how  we  move  from  a  technology  of  sympathy  to  a Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11, Brassett 
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politics of empathy that emplaces trauma – and the subjects of trauma - as the key 
ethico-political question? Trauma is problematic and contingent. While mechanisms 
of  global  governance  are  emerging  to  address  terrorist  attacks,  the  effects  of  war, 
natural  disasters,  and  so  on,  from  a  critical  perspective  the  operation  of  these 
mechanisms is itself constitutive of understandings of trauma. This constitution can 
be problematic, unstable and/or progressive and it can involve an array of political 
subjects including counsellors, survivors, lawyers, and the media. Therefore, we must 
adapt to the suggestion of cosmopolitanism that the extant politics of vulnerability is 
happening  in  particular  sites  of  ‘global  governance’:  understood  to  include 
institutions, networks, and media, but also knowledge about trauma counselling, the 
trauma profession and the survivor groups that contest the meaning of their own 
trauma often years after the ‘event’. Such a complex schema may swing against the 
‘will to management’ in contemporary discourses of global governance. In ethico-
political  terms,  however, it is essential for  understanding  how  we  come  to  ‘know’ 
what trauma is, and how we might politicise such knowledge in order to realise new 
ethical possibilities perhaps, but not necessarily, in line with cosmopolitanism.  
In  short,  while  cosmopolitan  sentiments  may  ask  good  questions,  the 
development  of  ‘answers’ should  rely  on  better  understandings  of the interaction 
between  modalities  of  becoming  (knowledge  about  trauma)  and  the  individual 
sites/subjects of production (counsellors, survivors, media, etc.) that make up the 
‘politics  of vulnerability’. This is  a  task for research,  but it is  also  an invitation  to 
engage  with  and  reform  policies  of  trauma  governance  that  are  more  clearly  the 
concern of practitioners and survivors. Ultimately, this argument does not then turn 
into  a  rejection  of  cosmopolitan  democracy,  so  much  as  a  call  for  its  further 
politicisation and continuous engagement (Brassett, 2010).  
 
 
1.  Cosmopolitan democracy as a response to 9-11 
 
What resources exist within the cosmopolitan paradigm for responding to 9-11? The 
question  is  important  because  cosmopolitan  authors  positioned  themselves  as 
progenitors of a critical and progressive alternative to discourses of a War on Terror 
(Archibugi,  2001;  Held  and  McGrew,  2007).  This  section  will  first  identify  the 
relationship  between  cosmopolitanism  and  trauma  before  questioning  the 
normative  framework  of  cosmopolitan  democracy –  especially  its  location  within 
systems of global governance – to suggest how it may silence far more than it raises in 
relation  to  trauma  and  vulnerability.  In  short,  laudable  cosmopolitan  sentiments 
may  be  subsumed  within  a  project  of  cosmopolitanism  that  closes  down 
consideration of ‘vulnerability’.  Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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Trauma, in the modern therapeutic sense, is used to refer to the experience 
of an event where our life, or the life of someone close to us, is threatened, where we 
have no control over what is happening, and where basic feelings of security are put 
in fundamental question. Many trauma sufferers have trouble dealing with the event 
and  will  either  repress  the  memory  or  strongly  dissociate  from  the  feelings  of 
vulnerability associated with it, using guilt, anger, or radical hope as a way of ‘using’ 
the event in the life continued. As Jenny Edkins argues, “Trauma is very much to do 
with the fact of survival in the face of death. The repetition that takes place in the 
dreams of trauma sufferers is not so much an attempt to make sense of the trauma 
itself, but an attempt to come to terms with the fact of survival.”  And on a societal 
level she says 
 
In our everyday lives, we prefer to forget our vulnerability. We pretend that it 
is possible to be completely secure and safe. Death is an accident or a failure, 
something that could be avoided with better protection or better systems of 
healthcare.  If  there  appears  to  be  some  threat  to  this  security,  people 
immediately look for ways to make themselves feel secure again. (2002, p. 247) 
 
On this view, 9-11 can be seen as a significant event for cosmopolitan ethics because 
it brings the issue of vulnerability to the centre of America and Europe. Television 
images of planes crashing into buildings, people jumping from buildings, the shocked 
faces of passers-by and the strange looking cloud of smoke that engulfed the city do 
not,  to  say  the  least,  tally  with  our  generalised  expectations  of  normal  life.  The 
question that arises is: how does cosmopolitanism address the trauma of 9-11? And, 
perhaps  more  critically,  how  does  the  ethical  subject  of  cosmopolitanism –  the 
reflexive and tolerant individual – articulate such reflexivity and tolerance if they are, 
to some extent at least, traumatised?4 
   On  one level, it  can  be  argued  that  cosmopolitan responses  to 9-11 are 
sensitive to trauma, there has been a clear focus on the loss of life; the indiscriminate 
use of violence highlighted must in some sense focus our minds upon vulnerability. 
Indeed, recent attempts to incorporate the ‘human security’ paradigm into global 
governance are some recognition of the all pervasiveness of vulnerability. Likewise, as 
considered  elsewhere  cosmopolitan  principles  of  global  justice  and  the  much 
vaunted  agency  of  global  civil  society  in  movements  such  as  the  Make  Poverty 
History Campaign clearly follow through on Linklater’s invitation to think through 
how  we might  understand  and  address vulnerability  to  human suffering  (Brassett, 
2008).  
On  another  level,  however,  there  is  a  danger  that  cosmopolitanism  might 
efface the politics of the trauma of 9-11 via a simple narrative of global hope: hope 
that we can learn, hope that we can improve, hope that we can make the world a Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11, Brassett 
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better place. Of course, such narratives are important at any time, but as a response 
to  trauma  they  perhaps  overshadow  the  experience  and  politics  of  trauma  in  a 
manner  commensurate  with  repression.  The  point  being  that  when  faced  with 
existential questions about ‘our own’ vulnerability we respond with models of global 
utopias to export to ‘others’. On the argument of Judith Butler we perhaps do ‘the 
others’  and  ourselves  a  disservice  by  failing  to  focus  on  the  ethics  and  politics  of 
mourning. 
Cosmopolitan democratic responses to 9-11 re-affirm the moral attractiveness 
of the reflexive individual who – at their best – is not only tolerant and sensitive to 
suffering, but is also, able “to reason from the point of view of others”, indeed such 
people  are  “better  equipped  to  resolve,  and  resolve  fairly,  the  challenging 
transboundary  issues  that  create  overlapping  communities  of  fate”  (Held  and 
McGrew, 2007, p. 41). Such reflexivity, such doubt and sensitivity to the potential 
suffering of others is, no doubt, an attractive ethical quality. This is especially so in 
light  of  the  common  charge  against  cosmopolitans  that  they  impose  a  violent 
subjectivity upon the non-Eurocentric ‘other’. But, in light of the fact of 9-11 as a 
traumatic event, is it possible that the violence might also be inner directed? The 
model  of  the  rational,  internally  balanced  individual  –  as  both  capable  of 
understanding their own contingencies and thinking from the point of view of others 
– is, to say the least, a tall order for everyone to achieve. In short, how can we reason 
from  the  point  of  view  of  others  when  we  may  have  the  far  larger  problem  of 
reasoning from the point of view of ourselves?  
While this may seem a relatively straightforward point to respond to, perhaps 
requiring a few caveats and provisos, I would suggest that such assumptions serve as 
a  foundation  for  the  unquestionably  grander  edifice  of  cosmopolitan  global 
governance. Addressing the ‘global’ in cosmopolitan democracy is itself a matter of 
unpicking how the ‘model’ is fundamentally tied to a normative conception of ethics 
and ethical agency. Held writes  
 
The anticipation of autonomy for each and all constitutes a regulative idea – 
an idea which has guided conflicts over the institutionalization of democracy. 
It is an idea, moreover which has provided a normative standard which could 
be  turned  against  existing institutions,  as it  has  been  by  the  working  class, 
feminist, anti-racist and anti-colonial activists, to reveal the extent to which 
the  principles  and  aspirations  of  equal  liberty  and  equal  political 
participation remain unfulfilled. (1995, p. 71).  
 
And  for  cosmopolitans,  the  prime  target  of  such  a  regulative  idea  is  global 
governance;  a  state-centric  political  system  is  gradually  replaced  by  a  form  of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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“heterarchy – a divided authority system – in which states seek to share the task of 
governance with a complex array of institutions, public and private, local, regional, 
transnational and global representing the emergence of ‘overlapping communities of 
fate’” (Held and McGrew, 1998, p. 221).  
Cosmopolitan  democracy  is  therefore  ‘global’  because  it  undermines 
appeals  to  fixed,  territorial  political  communities  associated  with  nation  states. 
Instead it identifies numerous and overlapping communities of fate that now exist in 
a supra-territorial context. And cosmopolitans seek to re-imagine the political basis 
of democracy by subjecting this complex global context to the normative principle 
of autonomy. This leads to various avenues including global institutional reforms to 
promote  accountability  and  inclusion,  increased  recognition  of  the  potential 
contribution of global civil society, and a cosmopolitan legal order.  
Three  inter-related  critical  points  can  be  made.  First,  cosmopolitan 
democracy ultimately hinges on a comprehensive conception of values - liberty & 
equality – which are extended to all people, everywhere. An apparently complex and 
contingent  global  scale  is  thus  rendered  to  a  pre-determined  normative  logic. 
Second, and drawing from critical IPE, globalisation should itself be understood as a 
constitutive discourse which engenders certain attitudes and logics. As such, when 
those attitudes or logics are either unquestionably accepted or, rendered according 
to  a  particular  normative  position  of  advocacy  then  it  immediately  pushes  the 
question: how do these new positions relate to, and converse with, all those people who don’t 
accept  or  agree  with the  discourse  as  it  is  constructed  in the first place?   And  finally,  quite 
simply, where is the ‘politics’ in democratic global governance? Global governance 
appears as an institutional embodiment of a set of shifts in the spatial organisation of 
modern  life.  ‘Politics’  in  the  sense  of  the  open  and  acknowledged  contest  and 
contestability of that ‘life’ appear somewhat peripheral. The crucial challenge is the 
‘issues’ of newly emergent global communities. While this clearly contests the ‘old’ 
frame of IR and political theory, such a contest arguably works to consolidate, rather 
than question, the founding assumptions of cosmopolitanism. Moreover, seeking to 
‘represent’ diverse ‘communities of fate’ within global governance does not address 
the  instabilities,  tensions,  and  political  dissonances  between  and  within  those 
communities. 
   Within the complex array of groups and actors within global civil society 
we  are  essentially  dealing  with  the  issue  of  diversity  and  disagreement.  Thus,  for 
some, politics in the context of global governance might mean supporting a project 
of  de-globalisation,  or,  in  the  case  of  terrorism,  it  could  actually  (and  counter 
intuitively  for  some)  involve  supporting  the  overthrow  of  America  or  Western 
society.  Despite  the  claims  to  openness  and  inclusion,  there  is  a  sense  of 
irreconcilability about how to be both global and democratic when ‘anti-global’ or 
‘localising’ sentiments might best describe the attitudes of many of those included.  Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11, Brassett 
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The relevance of this democratic critique of cosmopolitan democracy can 
be seen when we try to engage with what might be called the ‘global traumatic stress 
community’.  If a  response  to  trauma is important for  cosmopolitan  authors,  then 
surely the voices of the traumatised is an important site of potential commonality? 
Indeed this is an argument that has received more or less optimistic endorsements in 
the  work  of  Andrew  Linklater  and  Judith  Butler.  More  located  arguments  have 
focused on the regenerative capacity of communities in the wake of disasters. Solnit 
(2009) even argues that the ‘normal’ response of communities in the wake of major 
disasters  is  altruism.  However,  I  want  to  argue  that  such  identifications  are 
problematic at best and – in line with the work of Jenny Edkins – either naïve about 
or actively contributory towards a totalising logic of sovereign power. 
On the one hand, attitudes towards trauma are simply not ‘always’ uniting and 
can  actually  lead  to  divisive  and  alienating  responses.  This  common  sense  of  the 
literature on trauma can no doubt be over done, but it does at least suggest rather 
less  agreement  on  our  global  togetherness  than  might  be  gleaned  from  Held’s 
schema. On the other hand, feelings of trauma, when experienced on a mass level are 
apt for manipulation, can be structured by power and can feed larger antagonisms. 
In  short,  vulnerability  to  trauma  fits  only  ambivalently  with  the  notion  of 
cosmopolitan ‘communities of fate’. While we may feel sympathy for the suffering of 
the  vulnerable,  others,  including  those  who  celebrated  and  danced  after  the 
September 11th attacks, may not. Likewise, while survivors and their associates may 
identify  with  each  other,  such  identification  may  skew  along  exclusively  state  or 
parochial lines, even before discussions of affirming sovereign authority in the face of 
insecurity begin.  I therefore suggest that there is no ‘natural kind’ at work in trauma 
(Young, 1995), it neither naturally divides nor unites, but is a subject of governance 
and, therefore, politics.  
 
2.  Governing trauma (or the trauma of governance) 
 
As Jenny Edkins (2002) argues the memorialisation of 9-11 marked an important limit 
on the politics of vulnerability. The inner directed morbidity of terrorist fallout was 
conjoined  to  the  myth  of  the  nation-protector,  mourning  in  such  a  way  as  to 
produce resolve. For some the resolve was to revenge, for others it was to survive in 
peace. But  both  projects  accepted  the initial  construction  that security  could  be 
provided  on  a  national  basis,  that  vulnerability  could  be  overcome,  as  it  were. 
Clearly,  this  move  was  not  complete.  The  climate  of  fear  in  the  US  and  Western 
states  in  subsequent  years  was  a  clear  embodiment  of  the  stressful  reactions  to 
vulnerability that were being felt. But they were all subject to a national rendition, a 
narrative of collective security for existence. What is perhaps less addressed in this Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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schema  of  sovereign  power  is  the  way  that  individual  experiences  of  trauma  are 
actually  governed,  and  how  that  form  of  governance  at  once  de-politicises  and 
globalises. Trauma itself becomes ‘known’, global.  
Returning to the question of a cosmopolitan response to traumatic events 
like 9-11, my  proposition is that it is not  enough  to simply  assert the  existence  of 
transnational networks that can be rendered to certain global ‘communities of fate’. 
This is, no doubt an elliptical and promising line of thought that immediately both 
questions to veracity of the nation state as the repository of community and politics 
and provides some ‘stuff’ for the often nebulous third person of global civil society in 
cosmopolitan discourse. However, from a critical perspective we also need to take 
time to think through, examine and question the types of knowledge that operate 
within – and act to constitute - such ‘networks’. My suggestion is that we need to 
combine a cosmopolitan awareness of the global context of traumatic events – and 
especially the suggestion that we all share a susceptibility to vulnerability – with a 
critical questioning of knowledge about trauma. The global governance of trauma is 
not simply a case of providing effective responses, neither is it a cosmopolitan variant 
of  all  happily  coming  together  in  mutual  understanding  of  our  collective 
vulnerability,  but  rather  of emplacing vulnerability itself  as  the key ethico-political 
question.  In  order  to  do  this,  an  appreciation  of  the  way  in  which  trauma  is 
known/produced is crucial.  
Trauma, in  the modern  therapeutic sense,  has  been subsumed  within  a 
technical  structure  of  psychological  knowledge  concerned  with  the  pathological 
effects on individuals. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was accepted in the 
Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  (DSM)  of  the  American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) within DSM-IV in 1994. DSM IV criteria involve some 
combination  of  the  following  symptoms:  ‘Re-experiencing  Phenomena’  including 
intrusive  memories,  dreams,  and  physiological/psychological  distress  to  cues, 
acting/feeling  as  if  events  are  recurring;  ‘Avoidance  and  Numbing’  including 
avoidance of thoughts, feelings, reminders, amnesia, reduced affect; and ‘Increased 
Arousal’ sleep difficulty, irritability or outbursts of anger, hyper vigilance, exaggerated 
startle  response  and  difficulty  concentrating  (Bisson,  2007,  p.  399).  Since  this 
relatively  recent  legitimation  in  the  psychological  knowledge,  PTSD  has  become 
widely  acknowledged  as  a key  psychological risk factor for  people who  experience 
major  disasters,  terrorist  attacks,  car  accidents, sexual  abuse,  and  so  on. Estimates 
suggest  that  60%  of  the  population  will  experience  something  in  the  range  of 
potentially  traumatic  events  during  their  life.  Although  it  is  widely  acknowledged 
that only a very small proportion of people who experience traumatic events will go 
on to develop PTSD. 
Despite the relatively recent arrival on the scene of trauma and PTSD as 
therapeutic  norms,  the  growth  of  trauma  counselling  as  a  profession  has  been Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11, Brassett 
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astronomical. While techniques are always evolving, various combinations of CBT, 
Eye Movement Desensitization therapy and prescribed drugs have become common 
and acceptable responses (NICE, 2005). Survivors of 9-11 were attended to by teams 
of psychologists on the day. In common with many recent disasters, people received 
post-trauma  interventions  like  Critical  Incident  Stress  Debriefing  (CISD)  or 
Psychological  De-Briefing  (PD).  The  aim  of such interventions is  to  monitor  and 
‘prevent’  the  onset  of  post-traumatic  stress  reactions.  Medical  evidence  for  the 
effectiveness of such interventions is, at best mixed, and at worst, negative, owing to 
the potential for producing ‘re-traumatisation’, via the perception that survivors are 
being asked to re-live the event against their wishes. Indeed, PD has been a major 
source  of  critical  debate  within  the  trauma  counselling  profession  in  recent  years 
(See Rose et al. 2005). 
As this last point suggests, knowledge about trauma and how to respond is 
constantly evolving within the psychological community. But this ambiguity has not 
prevented  the growth  and spread  of knowledge  about PTSD  or the expansion  of 
systems  for  addressing  major  disasters  in  terms  of  psychological,  rather  than  say, 
medical or social welfare criteria. Indeed, a number of critical scholars have pointed 
out  the  problematic  aspects  of  the  rapid  and  questionable  globalisation  of  such 
knowledge/practices.  Pupavac  (2001)  questions  the  widespread  turn  to  consider 
development  and  peacekeeping  in  terms  of  the  ‘emotionology  of  ‘therapeutic 
governance’. Aradau (2009) notes how refugees, in particular, trafficked women, are 
subjected to diagnoses of PTSD and asked to submit to counselling as a condition 
for  receiving  social  support.  Likewise,  Mark  Fowle  (2009)  recounts  how 
peacekeeping organisations in Vukovar sometimes make submission to counselling a 
condition of joining.  
The suggestion is that the global governance of trauma is dominated by a 
technology  of  sympathy  that  draws  impetus  from  disastrous  moments  and  then 
simply ‘turns on’ the therapeutic governance machine. Given the timeline, it might 
be tempting to suggest a straightforward narrative of PTSD in the US being rendered 
down to provide a technological account of the ‘emotionally competent individual’ 
of CBT that is then exported across the world. Indeed, this is a position that many 
have adopted in light of the evangelical zeal of some PTSD ‘campaigners’. Likewise, 
as Pupavac suggests, the knowledge fits very easily into meta-narratives of our time 
that  involve  dislocation,  problem-solving  and  medicalisation  as  central  parts  of  a 
general malaise.  
While  sympathetic  to  such  critical  arguments,  I  would  like  to  suggest  a 
slightly  different  approach  that  draws  upon  the  ongoing  interactions 
between/within  knowledge  about  trauma  and  the  subjects  concerned,  including 
counsellors  and  survivors,  as  well  as  the  institutions  that  support  them.  Straight Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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arguments that trauma knowledge is de-politicising or productive of ‘victims’, while 
certainly engaging, may miss the potential for and practice of politics in these new 
modalities. Indeed, as Didier Fassin (2008, p. 534) argues, “humanitarian psychiatry is 
itself another instance of power that,..., prescribes a certain discourse: its compassion 
for  trauma  produces  a  particular  form  of  subjectification  that  is  imposed  on 
individuals, but through which they can also exist politically.” On this view, while the 
knowledge  and  practice  of  trauma  governance  is  clearly  problematic,  we  cannot 
ignore the ways in which the subjects it produces – the counsellors and the survivors 
–  are  always-already  capable  of  further  production.  For  Fassin  this  involves  the 
potential  for  humanitarian  psychology  to  serve  as  a  critique  of  violence,  that  by 
narrating  experiences  in  terms  of  trauma  we  can  (albeit  problematically)  open  a 
window  upon  the  inequalities  and  injustices  of  conflict.  Likewise,  I  suggest  that 
trauma can be instructive for thinking about the ethics of global governance. 
My  suggestion  is  that  the  experience  of  vulnerability  associated  with  trauma 
might  actually  cut  directly  ‘against’  attempts  to  technologise  global  governance 
according  to  therapeutic  knowledge.  Against  practices  of  therapeutic  governance 
that ‘level down’, in a sense, rendering trauma as a common event with a common 
solution,  I  suggest  the  opposite.  Trauma  has  power  over  individuals  precisely 
because it is unknowable, it cannot be put into words. Each experience of trauma is 
a  singularity.  Each  attempt  (by  counsellors  or  others)  to  let  individuals  come  to 
terms with trauma is equally so. In this sense, vulnerability is not something that can 
be ‘known’, ‘responded to’, or ‘governed’. Sympathy may be an appropriate emotion 
for  generating  resources  and  driving  processes,  but  empathy  might  say  more? 
Empathy at least suggests our own vulnerability is part of the story, that attempts to 
‘respond’ through global governance are equally attempts to create a distance from 
our own vulnerability. Reversing an earlier construction, the global is writ individual, 
a sop to our own existential fragility. 
 
3.  Engaging the Politics of Vulnerability 
 
To unpack the progress of this argument, cosmopolitan sentiments in the wake of 9-
11 sought to turn our attention to vulnerability. Drawing from the work of David 
Held, it was suggested that the move to mediate global vulnerability via community 
based  responses  was  promising  but  limited  (and  further  that  it  exposed  certain 
contradictions between the universal and the democratic in Held). The first limit is 
that trauma can provoke a range of responses, some uniting, some divisive that play 
out on a mass level in a politically mediated and contested manner. The second limit 
is that building this global community of vulnerability in relation to traumatic events 
is currently heavily and performatively influenced by psychological knowledge about 
trauma. To wit, cosmopolitan networks are only one part of the puzzle and a critical Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11, Brassett 
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appraisal of the constitutive powers of knowledge operating within such networks is 
crucial. However, identifying the limits of cosmopolitan sentiments in this way is not 
a move to reject, but rather to politicise and engage. That traumatic communities 
are  problematic  does  not  imply  that  they  are  unimportant.  And  recognising  the 
constitutive  power  of  knowledge  does  not  imply  that  the  subjects  produced  are 
unable to produce themselves in different ways. The point is that a cosmopolitan 
democratic response has to caution itself against ‘imposing’ an ethics – reflexive or 
otherwise  –  since  (traumatic)  subjects  are  in  a  process  of  becoming  that  can 
produce  its  own  ethics.  This  bottom  up  production  of  cosmopolitanism  is  a 
complex  and  ambiguous  subject  that  requires  a  pragmatic  turn  to  context  and 
engagement (Brassett, 2010). 
This final section  will  now  draw these  points  together in  a  discussion  of 
what it terms the politics of vulnerability. Having problematised the idea that there is 
either a ‘natural kind’ response to trauma (e.g. altruistic, divisive, etc.), or, that the 
subject  of  trauma  can  be  tranquilised  (beyond  politics)  via  the  deployment  of 
psychological knowledge/practice, the task is instead to ‘hear’ the subjects of trauma 
and  vulnerability.  In  short,  both  cosmopolitan  democracy  and  psychological 
knowledge about trauma assume that the governance of vulnerability will be a one 
way process: top down problem solving. My argument is that trauma and traumatic 
events are intensely political and politicising in a way that might problematise and go 
beyond existing constructions of cosmopolitan ethics.5  
Perhaps oversimplifying there is something about the dry constructions of 
cosmopolitanism, global governance, and indeed trauma counselling that portrays 
global  ethics  in  a  universal  manner  that  overlooks  the  continued  and  changing 
significance  of  us/them  dichotomies. On  the  one  hand,  critically speaking,  I  have 
suggested  that  ‘we’,  in  fact,  need  the  (discussion  of  the)  global  governance  of 
traumatic  events in  order  to  provide  ourselves  with some  distance from  our  own 
vulnerability.  It  is  simply  heartening  for  those  unaffected  to  hear  that  there  are 
mechanisms of response in place: it re-assures us of our preparedness, resilience and 
civilisation. On the other hand, more constructively, it may be that by engaging such 
critical questions we might be better able to hear the voices of those who experience 
trauma? Once we move from a technology of sympathy to open up empathy as an 
important (though problematic) question, we press the idea that we currently lack 
an ability to hear and understand the voices of the vulnerable. Currently the voices 
of  survivors  are  rendered  to  the  logics  of  legal  compensation,  truth  commissions, 
baring witness and memorialisation. My suggestion is that beyond these important, 
but predictable, responses there are ongoing discussions of what it means to live with 
vulnerability, what it means to live with others and ourselves.  
Vulnerability is at the heart of ethical impulses to protect and to care for Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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suffering  yet  there  are  remarkably  few  examples  of  a  positive  definition  of  what 
vulnerability  might  mean.  Trauma,  especially  in  the  modern  therapeutic  sense, 
carries a number of positive definitional qualities relating the nature and emotional 
experience of events where lives – our own or others – are threatened. While these 
positive definitions are clearly contested and contestable, not least because of their 
re-ification  of  particular  understandings  of  the  ‘normal’,  emotionally  competent, 
individual-as-subject, such knowledge nevertheless requires engagement and where 
necessary contest. It is not enough to simply write off such rationalities as discourses 
of  power,  or  meta-narratives  of  our  time.  Rather  we  need  to  see  how  such 
rationalities are perpetuated, with what effects, and how might they be changed (or 
in a process of changing). As the previous section argued,  drawing on Fassin, the 
commonplace (indeed normalised) use of trauma counselling in everyday situations 
of trauma and traumatic events has rendered countless subjects in particular ways. 
By focusing on these subjects, how they contest the meaning of their experiences, we 
might ‘learn from’, rather than simply ‘respond to’ vulnerability. 
Connecting  these  points  together,  there  are remarkably few  attempts  to 
engage the vulnerable in the discussion of what trauma might mean. Global ethics, as 
an academic discourse, has been more comfortable to either assume a basic common 
standard  of suffering, i.e. levelling  pain,  loss,  death, starvation,  homelessness, rape, 
violence, etc. – or to proceed in less affirmative terms, engaging narratives of suffering 
as a means to open up our consciences to such concerns (Rorty, 1998). I suggest 
that the contemporary politics of trauma represents fertile ground to productively 
engage  with  the  ethico-political  question  of  vulnerability.  Firstly,  vulnerability  is 
something  we  are  all  susceptible  to.  While  Richard  Rorty  (1998)  talks  about 
sympathy, for instance,  the  existential  nature  of  vulnerability  ‘might’  allow for  the 
identification  and  nurturing  of  empathy  as  a  more  appropriate/powerful  ethical 
sentiment.  And  secondly,  beneath  the  technocratic  veil  of  ‘traumatology’  and, 
indeed, terms like trauma victim/survivor there are individuals and groups with lived 
experiences,  biographies,  moral  webs  and  so  forth.  In  my  view,  the  politics  of 
vulnerability works as both ethical concern for the development of empathy but also 
(or through) an acute empirical politics involving trauma counsellors, survivors and, 
furthermore, all those involved in the production of knowledge about trauma.     
One example of this more located concern is that survivors actively contest 
the  contours  of  their  own  experiences  in  the  process  of  organisation,  through 
counselling, and in the kinds of work they go on to do in their ‘post-traumatic lives’. 
For instance, one survivor from the Marchioness Boat disaster was moved to develop 
a career photographing survivors of the Rwandan genocide as part of his exploration 
of  the  politics  of  memorialisation.  Developing  from  this  and  other  empirical 
examples, the subjects of trauma, and the individual who experiences the event, may 
hold within them important resources for thinking about global ethics?  Cosmopolitan Sentiments After 9-11, Brassett 
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The value of this argument is that is simultaneously circumvents the twin 
flaws of ‘ignorance’ or ‘victimisation’ in relation to subjects of trauma. Each of these 
flaws  in  the  global  governance  of  trauma  is  clearly  problematic  and  indeed 
potentially  counterproductive  to  the  ethical  cause  of  understanding  or  feeling 
empathy for vulnerability. But each flaw is born of the same issue, which is a failure to 
include  the  voices  of  the  subjects  concerned  in  the  (political)  negotiation  of 
meaning associated with the global governance of trauma. By including the subjects 
of trauma more centrally I follow the cosmopolitans in calling for a more democratic 
approach.  This  is  not  the  democracy  of  voting  and  elections.  Rather  it  is  the 
democracy  of  engagement,  where  people  are  included  in  the  negotiation  of 
meanings that affect their lives. This might be in the way that particular experts in the 
trauma counselling community contest expert knowledge about what trauma is or 
who  should  respond  to  it.  For  instance,  the  clinical  psychologist  Jon  Bisson  has 
actively contested the (previously accepted) practice of Critical Incident De-Briefing 
(CID)  and  has  led  the  way  in  promoting  the  importance  of  a  more  diversely 
inclusive  ‘global  traumatic  stress  community’.  Likewise,  I  suggest  that  those  who 
experience traumatic events ‘may’ themselves contribute to our understandings of 
the  politics  of  vulnerability.  Controversially,  perhaps,  this  draws  on  the  lived 
experiences of trauma survivors who (with or without counselling) have gone to on 
to make important  contributions  to  politics  and  the  world  around  them. We are 
quite  used  to  the  suggestion  that  the  experience  of  trauma  can  have  a  major 
influence  on  art  or  creativity.  We  are  less  attuned  to  the  possibility  that  it  might 
impact in other realms as well, including politics. This is a task for research, but is 
always already a constitutive force in cosmopolitan global governance.      
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, the paper has explored the question of a cosmopolitan response to 9-
11.  It  suggested  that  the  key  distinguishing  factor  was  a  focus  upon  the  issue  of 
trauma  and  vulnerability.  When  cemented  to  a  model  of  global  governance, 
however,  it  was  argued  that  cosmopolitanism  succumbs  to  a  top-down  response 
that  generates  ‘sympathy’  for  the  affected  communities,  but  only  allows  for  their 
political inclusion via an instrumental logic of representation regulated according to 
universal norms of liberty and equality. Thus the argument turned to an engagement 
with  the  politics  of  Held’s  ‘communities  of  fate’ –  in  particular  the  question  of 
whether there might be a ‘global traumatic stress community’. Against the interesting 
idea that trauma affected communities might be ‘naturally’ altruistic (Solnit, 2009) or 
divisive, it was suggested that no such certainties could be attributed. The ambiguity 
of trauma at the individual, let alone a community, level combined with the critical Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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issue of how traumatic memory is manipulated and rendered according to sovereign 
power (Edkins, 2003) means that a different track is required. Therefore, the paper 
interrogated how the production of knowledge about trauma has become a crucial 
element  in  the  constitution  of  the  global  governance  of  trauma.  Rather  than 
rejecting such  constitutions  as simply  the  negative  consequences  of  power, it  was 
suggested  that  we  might  interrogate  such  subjects  as  both  produced  by  and 
productive of ethical possibility.   
In  conclusion,  this  argument  suggests  that  cosmopolitan  sentiments  are 
rarely if ever translated into an unproblematic politics. In fairness, I doubt whether 
any cosmopolitan author would find this point the least bit surprising. However, the 
suggestion  that  engagement  with  the  ambiguities  and  ambivalences  of  such 
‘cosmopolitics’  can  render  up  important  lessons  and  (potentially)  new  ethical 
horizons might shift concerns slightly. The cosmopolitan impulse to open up to and 
engage  vulnerability  is  a  laudable  ethical  question.  But  the  prosecution  of  this 
impulse  has  revolved  around  a  set  of  straightforward  closures:  affirming  universal 
global norms, practices of therapeutic governance and a subsequent ‘eventalisation’ 
of global governance. Perhaps cosmopolitanism is destined to re-produce openness 
and closure by dint of its desire to retain strategic relevance (Brassett, 2008; Parker 
2009). What is less clear is whether and how engagement with the subjects produced 
by such processes is itself an opportunity to learn about new possibilities – for others 
and ourselves - beyond the cosmopolitan paradigm (Brassett and Bulley, 2007).  
Engaging the politics of vulnerability associated with trauma involves both 
grappling with the production of sympathy for suffering and the recognition that, in 
doing so, we also necessarily express empathy. The distinctiveness of empathy in the 
context of trauma is that it can only ever be based on the recognition of our inability 
to ‘know’ ‘vulnerability’. In this sense, I suggest, it may be helpful to think about the 
politics of vulnerability in terms of an ethico-political conversation where many of 
the words either do not exist or, rather, the speakers (and listeners) are engaged in 
the process of inventing them.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 This paper is an expanded version of a plenary address made at the 2009, Political 
Studies Association Conference. For comments and support in the development 
of  this  paper  the  author  thanks Claudia  Aradau, Chris Brown, Chris Browning, 
Dan  Bulley,  David  Held,  Kim  Hutchings,  Matt  McDonald,  Owen  Parker, 
Columba Peoples, and Len Seabrooke. 
2 While the paper focuses on David Held this is not to suggest that he is the only 
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voice on cosmopolitanism. Held is of particular interest because of his prominence 
as a global scholar and the location of his arguments at the cusp of academic and 
policy discussion. The strategic relevance of cosmopolitanism is often overlooked 
or seen as philosophically problematic, whereas I regard it a crucial aspect of the 
performativity of global ethics (See Brassett, 2008).   
3 While criticised in this paper, the ‘communities of fate’ element of Held’s position is 
an  extremely  promising  development  in  the  current  outpouring  of  (more 
grounded versions of) the cosmopolitan paradigm and carries synergies with other 
more sociological approaches to cosmopolitanism and globalization such as the 
work of Ulrich Beck (2005, 2006, 2007) and Jan Aart Scholte (2005).  
4 In making  this  connection  between  the event  of 9-11 and  the  traumatisation  of 
individuals  it  is  important  to  remain  sensitive  to  the  difficulties  involved  with 
speaking  about  trauma.  Experiencing  trauma  and  becoming  ‘traumatised’ 
(especially  in  the  long  run)  are  different  things.  Likewise,  the  suggestion  of  a 
traumatised  society  presents  further  difficulties  of  anthropomorphising  the 
community according to particular knowledge about how individuals experience 
trauma that is itself contestable. However, I think it is fair to suggest, for the sake of 
argument, that those who experience trauma and those who live with PTSD have 
just as much right of inclusion in cosmopolitan democratic systems as anybody 
else and we should have some idea of the relative burden of rational reflexivity in 
such circumstances.      
5 To underline, a critical analysis of existing cosmopolitan ‘models’ does not carry a 
rejection of cosmopolitan ethics. In line with the work of the British sociologist 
Robert Fine  (2005)  the suggestion is rather  that  we  can  retain  a  cosmopolitan 
imagination/attitude  without  re-ifying  any  of  the  universal  signifiers  (be  they 
ethical or institutional) that existing cosmopolitans identify. In short, we can take 
the ‘-ism’ out of cosmopolitanism.  
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